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 Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard and the Unspeakable 
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Dick Liebendorfer, Faculty Mentor (Philosophy) 
Abstract 
Soren Kierkegaard and Ludwig Wittgenstein have long been thought of as 
philosophers with little, if anything in common. There are but a handful of contemporary 
philosophers who have provided links between works by Kierkegaard and works by 
Wittgenstein; however no one has, at least explicitly, provided the following link I intend 
to show in this paper. I will show Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling and Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus have a remarkably common theme. The theme is the 
ability of one to communicate, or understand the unspeakable, that which remains beyond 
the limits of language. Both have a unique approach to arriving at the same conclusion, 
Kierkegaard through religion and Wittgenstein through logic, but each reaches a point in 
which a person must remain silent.  
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 1. Introduction
The idea of saying and showing in relation to language, the idea that there are 
structural features of thought and language which cannot be rationally articulated but that 
none-the-less show them, make themselves manifest, was first extensively developed by 
Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus1. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein 
develops the mentioned idea in connection with the picture theory of propositions. The 
idea that there are limits to language, limits on what can be rationally articulated, which 
one must adhere is also at least implicitly advocated by Soren Kierkegaard in Fear and 
Trembling2. Kierkegaard, however unlike Wittgenstein, was not concerned principally 
with representations of linguistic and cognitive structure. Rather, he was concerned with 
rational articulations of the religious. In this paper I intend to demonstrate the striking, 
and overlooked, similarities between Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling and 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus in regards to the limits of language and rationality. I also will 
apply Wittgenstein’s later work, Philosophical Investigations3, which provides another 
argument for understanding Fear and Trembling.  
There are numerous differences between these philosophers. They employ 
different vocabulary to develop their respective concerns with regards to what can be 
rationally articulated. They make different claims concerning what eludes rational 
representation. Also, there are differences between the goals of their respective projects 
as well as the circumstance or ambitions that lead each to try to say what is argued to be 
‘unsayable’. Yet, despite such differences, a key similarity prominently remains and is 
the focus of this paper. I will first develop and explain the picture theory of propositions 
presented by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus and explain the terms employed by 
Wittgenstein to articulate this philosophical problem. It is by appeal to the picture theory 
that Wittgenstein distinguishes what can be said from what can only be shown. After 
developing and explaining the picture theory of propositions and its consequences I will 
provide an argument for the link between Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling and 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. I will then provide an alternative view to understanding the 
character of the ineffable by way of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. This 
final alternative view which I offer will provide yet another level of depth to the 
comparison of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. I will offer a view that something is 
inarticulate because the form’s of life, the context of language, is lost, unlike the 
Tractarian view in which something is inarticulate because it is absolutely ineffable. 
There exists no fixed boundary as in the Tractatus, but rather a floating boundary 
dependent on context. First, my exposition on the Tractatus. 
2. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
 Wittgenstein’s book, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, presents, for the first time, 
Wittgenstein’s picture theory of propositions. This section provides an exposition and 
explanation of the picture theory. This will lead to an explanation of how Wittgenstein’s 
theory of language emerges from his picture theory, and finally set up the argument for a 
connection between Kierkegaard’s talk of the irrational and rational and Wittgenstein’s 
talk of the difference between being inside and outside language. 
1 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Routledge 1974. 
2 Fear and trembling, Soren Kierkegaard, edited by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton 1983. 
3 Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Blackwell 2001 
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 Wittgenstein calls a proposition a logical picture and propositional structure 
logico-pictorial structure. The picture theory of propositions builds on a view about the 
ordinary pictures and their relation to the states of affairs they depict. An ordinary picture 
of, say, ‘a cat on a fence’, is a complete picture. There is a cat and it is pictured as being 
on a fence. The picture is complete in that it is specific and definite. The same can be said 
of propositions considered as logical pictures. The expression ‘is on a fence’ is not a 
complete picture and it is not a complete proposition. Wittgenstein’s view is that 
complete propositions are the primary bearers of meaning and that expressions such as ‘is 
on the fence’ have meaning only in so far as they make a contribution to the meaning of a 
complete proposition, a complete picture.   
The need for the picture theory of propositions is made apparent at the beginning 
of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Wittgenstein claims the world is everything that is the case 
(1)4. The ultimate constituents of the world are the facts and not the objects that in 
combination make up the facts. Since we want an account of the world, of what is the 
case, a mere list of objects will not provide this. A list will not tell us what is true and 
false. Objects which are named can be said to exist only in so far as they are components 
of facts. Alone, as opposed to being in combination, names of objects yield only 
incomplete pictures. Facts must have complexity; they must break down into objects, into 
simpler parts. Otherwise there would not be a describable fact, there would only be a 
namable object. But an account of the world requires that we be able to say at least, for 
example, that such and such an object exists at such and such a time or place. 
Wittgenstein says that the general form of a proposition is “this is how things stand” 
(4.5). In this respect a proposition is a picture of possible states of affairs. If the state of 
affairs exists the proposition is true and if the state of affairs does not exist the 
proposition is false. The world is constituted by existing states of affairs. Reality, in 
contrast, is constituted by all possible states of affairs. False propositions picture possible 
states of affairs. ‘My car is black’ is a state of affairs, but there is also a possible state of 
affairs in which it is red. I’ve only to paint it red and what was false becomes true. Thus 
even false propositions depict states of affairs. They picture possible states of affairs but 
not actually existing states of affairs. In this sense false propositions picture reality.  
The meaning of a proposition, its sense, is given by the state of affairs that it 
pictures. Ultimately, this requires that propositions be composed of simple names and 
simple objects. It requires that there be a point where signs and the world necessarily 
connect. This point is reached when signs can be understood only in connection with the 
objects referred to. If the signs are to be understood in connection with yet more signs, 
argues Wittgenstein, there is no need for a picturing relation to states of affairs in the 
world. But signs and the propositions in which they figure can not always be understood 
in connection with yet more signs, more propositions. If signs were always understood in 
connection with yet more signs there would not be any essential connection with the 
world and so one would not know what she says to be the case. If “…whether a 
proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true…in that 
case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false)” (2.0211-2.0212). 
In summary reality is made up of both the existence and non-existence state of 
affairs. By picturing facts we represent reality, or more specifically we provide a picture 
4Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is a series of numbered remarks, I will make references to Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus parenthetically in the text, mentioning the number of a remark. 
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of reality, by picturing states of affairs that may or may not exist.5 We can say to be the 
case, a proposition can say to be the case only what is a possible state of affairs. That a 
proposition pictures a state of affairs requires that the proposition and the state of affairs 
share a structure. For example, ‘the car is red’ shares a structure with the state of affairs 
that the car is red. ‘The car is red’ predicates the property named by ‘red’ of the object 
named by the ‘car’. This structure is duplicated by the state of affairs. The fact that the 
car is red involves an object, the car, having the property red. It is only in virtue of 
sharing structure that a proposition can picture a state of affairs and so be either true or 
false. The proposition is true if the world is as the proposition pictures it, and false if the 
world is not as the proposition pictures it.  
But now we encounter a problem. A picture cannot depict its own pictorial form. 
A picture is able only to display this form. It must be the case that a picture can only 
display its pictorial form, because a picture depicts a state of affairs and does so in virtue 
of sharing structure, a form, with that state of affairs. A picture cannot depict that 
structure; it can only depict a state of affairs with that structure and do so by duplicating 
the structure. At best another picture could be created which pictures, or duplicates, the 
first picture. The second picture then does not picture its own pictorial form; rather, it 
pictures the first picture and does so in virtue of sharing a structure with the first picture. 
That is to say, the depiction of its pictorial form is impossible because pictorial form does 
not have the tools to depict pictorial form from outside of its structure. I can step outside 
the garage and picture, represent that the car is red, but I cannot stand outside 
representational structure and represent that structure. Diego Velasquez’s painting Las 
Meninas, is, according to Michel Foucault, in his work The Order of Things: An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences, an attempt to illustrate the idea that there are 
limitations on the ability to represent representational form.6 Velasquez’s painting depicts 
a painter painting a scene. But we see only the backside of the painter’s canvas. We see 
the subject of the painting only as a reflection in a mirror. Thus the representational 
relation between the painting and the subject of the painting is left mysterious.  
A picture’s structure is such that it is able to exist only inside the picture it 
structures. Propositions thus cannot step outside structure and say anything about it. 
Propositions are in this respect like ordinary pictures. A picture can not say anything 
about its own pictorial form; it can only say something about a state of affairs that it 
depicts. A picture of a red car, for example, says that the car is red. But the picture says 
nothing about the structure of the picturing relation. We can call this problem, which 
arises in Wittgenstein, the inside-outside problem. Inside pictorial form one can only 
provide pictures, including pictures of pictures. These pictures picture states of affairs 
which make up reality. As said above what a picture pictures, what it represents is its 
sense or content. Pictorial form is just a special case of logical form. 
A picture must contain the possibility of the situation that it represents (2.203). A 
picture of a red car and the proposition ‘the car is red’ both intend a particular state of 
affairs. This must be the case or a picture does not satisfy the constraints that 
Wittgenstein places on intelligible propositions. Pictures, and propositions as pictures, 
5 “A picture is a model of reality” (2.12), “A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and 
non-existence of states of affairs” (2.11), and “We picture facts to ourselves” (2.1). 
6 The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences pp. 3-16, Michel Foucault, Vintage Books 
1973. 
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 exist in logical space. Logical space determines both the form and content of intelligible 
propositions and thereby determines what are possible states of affairs. Logical space and 
the possibility of states of affairs are given by simple names, the objects they denote and 
by the possibility of those names and objects combining with one another to form 
propositions and states of affairs. The content of names is derived form the objects named 
and form is derived from the possibilities of combination. Thus, for example, ‘the car is 
red’ is an intelligible proposition and pictures a possible state of affairs. The expression 
‘the square root of two is red’ is not intelligible and does not picture a possible state of 
affairs.7 Since names get their meaning from the objects they denote, objects must exist if 
names have meaning. Yet as Robert J. Foglin8 explains, every object must exist in a state 
of affairs within a range of possible states of affairs. He constructs a simple world which 
exhibits how objects combine to form possible state of affairs. 
A                             B                                  C                              D 
Figure 1.19  
(a, b, c, d should be labeled down the left-hand side beginning with a in the top box followed by b, c, d in 
each subsequent box but due to formatting issues this was not possible to include in the diagram) 
This grid as a whole illustrates a region of logical space, where the shaded boxes 
represent actual combinations of objects, and the unshaded boxes represent possible 
combinations of the objects, combinations which do not obtain. Logical space is made up 
of the possible combinations of one object with another object. Possible combinations are 
Aa, Bb, Cc, Dd, Ab and so on, but AB is not a possible combination. Irrationality results 
when we try to construct propositions in a way that lies outside logical space. Logical 
space is exhibited by the possible combinations within the gird. 
By appeal to the grid we can also clarify the difference between what can be said 
and what can only be shown. Aa can be combined and AB cannot be combined; so Aa 
can be said but AB cannot be asserted. We can not say, assert, that ‘car’ and ‘red’ can be 
combined in the proposition ‘the car is red’, nor that ‘square root of two’ and ‘red’ can 
not be combined. Rather the possibility of the former and impossibility of the latter 
shows itself. In neither case can one construct a picture or proposition which pictures or 
says the thing in question. Since ‘the car is red’ is intelligible it would be empty to assert 
that it is. Neither can one say that red is a color. That ‘red’ is the name of a color shows 
itself. But if ‘red’ is already understood, it is empty to assert that red is a color. In the 
linguist’s vocabulary, there are aspects of syntactic and semantic structure that can not be 
significantly said can not be significantly represented.  
The claim that red is a color is a priori true. That is, one does not need to look to 
the world to discover its truth. It is true in virtue of the meaning of the signs that compose 
the claim. The claim that the square root of two is red is a priori false. In both cases, 
thinks Wittgenstein, they are not genuine propositions since they do not picture states of 
7 Wittgenstein does not give examples of simple names and objects. I do not assume that ‘red’, ‘car’ and 
‘square root of two’ would qualify. But nothing hangs on the examples here. 
8 Wittgenstein: Second Edition pp. 7-8, Robert J. Foglin, edited by Ted Hondriech, Routledge 1976. 
9 This grid is a duplication of the grid used by Foglin on p. 8 of Wittgenstein: Second Edition   
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 affairs whose existence or failure to exist render the propositions true or false. So one 
cannot say that red is a color, nor can one say that it is not the case that the square root of 
two is red. But these things none the less show themselves. Similarly, the claim that the 
car is red is a genuine proposition; it pictures a state of affairs and is true or false 
depending on whether the state of affairs exists. That it is a genuine proposition shows 
itself. There is no state of affairs that is pictured by ‘the proposition that the car is red is a 
genuine proposition’; so “the proposition that the car is red is a genuine is not a genuine 
proposition”,  
A possible situation would be a situation which is not yet settled to be either true 
or false. Reality is made up of such possible situations. Wittgenstein defines reality as 
what can be pictured. All genuine possible situations correspond with the possible 
existence and non-existence of states of affairs. Therefore the picture must be true or 
false, correct or incorrect. And so, anything which can be asked can in principle be 
answered. One can never offer a question which can not, at least in principle, be 
answered. A possible situation in logical space is a situation which can be verified to 
obtain or not obtain. If the picture can be constructed at all it can be judged true or false. 
However, the truth or falsity is independent of pictorial form, if it were not, the proposed 
proposition would be a tautology and therefore not a genuine proposition.  
Traditionally, philosophers have raised questions which cannot be answered in 
propositions that conform to the requirements of the picture theory. The problem with 
philosophers, according to Wittgenstein, is that they do not understand that language is 
the problem which needs to be dealt with, not other frequently raised and unanswerable 
questions. Philosophical questions, according to Wittgenstein, are questions about the 
essential structure of thoughts, propositions and the world, structure which Wittgenstein 
believes we can say nothing about. And so “what we cannot speak about we must pass 
over in silence”. (7)  
Among the things philosophers try to say something about, but on Wittgenstein’s 
view nothing can be said, are in ethics. Ethics tries to say how things ought to be rather 
then how things are. But a claim about how things ought to be does not picture a state of 
affairs in the world. It is neither true nor false, and so not a genuine proposition. 
Historically, ethics begins with alleged factual claims about human nature and then 
proceeds to claim that a moral and happy life is a life in accord with the facts of human 
nature. While “the world of a happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man” 
(6.42), Wittgenstein claims that the difference is not a factual difference. One’s attitude 
towards the world is different, but the facts are not, “not what can be expressed by means 
of language”. (6.43) According to the picture theory if a state of affairs cannot be 
depicted there is nothing to be judged true or false, correct or incorrect. There is 
representation only in pictorial form. Only what has logico-pictorial form can be 
expressed in language and “the limits of ones language mean the limits of ones world”. 
(5.6) Ethics, then can only be part of the limit, the structure of the world. There are no 
ethical facts. 
Wittgenstein’s own claims in the Tractatus do not satisfy the requirements of the 
picture theory of propositions. Claims such as that propositions picture states of affairs 
and that logico-pictorial form can not be pictured are not themselves claims that might be 
either true or false, they are not themselves claims that picture states of affairs that may 
or may not exist. Thus Wittgenstein says that his own propositions are nonsensical and 
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 should be seen as a ladder which once climbed up is to be thrown away. (6.54) The 
reader must transcend these propositions to see the world as the facts it is made up of.   
This is similar to the way Kierkegaard writes Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 
James Conant’s essay “Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and Nonsense” deals with this 
similarity at length.10 My paper will not deal with the similarities of the Postscript and 
the Tractatus, but I believe it is important to show other comparisons between these two 
philosophers. Both Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard remark at the end their books that all of 
what their books intend to say is nonsensical and completely contradictory to the 
premises of their books. However there is great importance in laying out the propositions 
anyway, even if you are to throw them away in the end. Conant describes these ladders as 
tools employed in producing clarity of vision. To fully understand the idea of language 
one must throw away the method with which one tries to understand language. You can 
only understand language through language, anything that is outside the expressive power 
of language must be unintelligible. Yet we want, Wittgenstein wants, to understand 
language itself. Just as Wittgenstein says logico-pictorial form cannot be represented in 
logico-pictorial form, Kierkegaard claims the religious cannot be understood in rational 
discourse. Wittgenstein tries to say something about logico-pictorial form, but concludes 
that form can only be shown. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein in the Tractatus appears to try to 
say what cannot be said. For Kierkegaard one falls into temptation if she attempts to step 
outside the rational, if she attempts to say what is irrational, communicate what cannot be 
communicated.  
3. Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling
To allow for an occasion to find oneself outside the rational there must exist, 
Kierkegaard believes, a teleological suspension of the ethical. This teleological 
suspension of the ethical is illustrated by Kierkegaard in his reinterpretation of the story 
of Abraham11. In the story Abraham is given a test of faith by God which requires him to 
take his only son Isaac to the top of the mountain and sacrifice him before God. Abraham 
cannot understand why God would ask this but does not doubt God’s command and 
remains deeply committed to his faith in God. Everyone who witnessed this event 
believed Abraham must be either committing murder and is therefore a murderer or 
something beyond rational comprehension and therefore something religiously wonderful 
which cannot be explained rationally. An individual such as Abraham, whose action is 
beyond rational explanation, Kierkegaard calls a knight of faith and calls the action 
absurd. The knight of faith is someone who is able to remain fully committed to an 
absurd action with faith that, as Kierkegaard says, through the absurd the object which 
was resigned will be granted back through the infinite. The infinite is what remains 
beyond the limits of the temporal and rational. The infinite is such that one can only find 
themselves within it but are not able to explain the phenomenon known as the absurd 
which places them there. To say that the absurd places them there or that they act through 
the absurd is just to say that the action escapes rational understanding. Rational articulate 
understanding is confined to particular cases occurring in time. That is rational articulate 
10 “Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and Nonsense”, James Conant, Pursuits of Reason, edited by Ted Cohen, 
Paul Guyer and Hillary Putnam, published by Texas Tech. University 1993. 
11 The story of Abraham, also known as the father of faith, is taken as a biblical story from the Old 
Testament. This story has multiple readings and interpretations and Kierkegaard uses four distinctly 
different readings of the story in Fear and Trembling to provide a more agreeable account of the story. 
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 understanding is finite and temporal. More specifically, one accepts that he must do 
something which has a particular consequence, and he accepts that the consequence will 
not occur. Accepting both is paradoxical and absurd. Yet what Kierkegaard calls 
resignation involves such paradoxical acceptance. 
The absurd occurs through an infinite resignation of faith to obtain what seemed 
unobtainable. The object in Abraham’s case is his son Isaac. Although Isaac is to be 
sacrificed, Abraham hopes for Isaacs return. In Kierkegaard’s own case it was the love of 
Regina, Kierkegaard’s fiancée, which is unrequited. The Complexities of Kierkegaard’s 
relationship with Regina left him compelled to reject her, all the while hoping, accepting, 
that she would return to him. This, as Kierkegaard would say, resignation of Regina is 
difficult for Kierkegaard to accept and he believes the story of Abraham would aid 
accepting and understanding it. To resign Regina Kierkegaard drove her away, breaking 
up their engagement, an engagement had in the finite, temporal world, in order to receive 
her love back once again in the infinite by virtue of the absurd. Kierkegaard believes 
receiving the resigned object back through the infinite is the most wonderful movement, 
albeit difficult movement, any person can expierence. The movement in Abraham’s case 
is, from the accepting God’s command to sacrifice Isaac to accepting that Isaac will be 
returned to him. The movement in Kierkegaard’s case is from accepting the compulsion 
to reject Regina to accepting that she would return to him. In both cases there is a 
paradox that cannot be understood in finite, temporal, rational terms. The movement 
cannot be understood, except ‘by virtue of acceptance of the absurd’. Abraham can in no 
way understand what occurs when he accepts that he must sacrifice Isaac as a show of 
faith. Abraham can only maintain faith in the paradox, as Kierkegaard says, in which the 
absurd exists. Kierkegaard believes the reason why the movement of resignation is so 
difficult is because a person has to be fully committed to the act of resignation. In 
Abraham’s case this would be the act of sacrifice, an act full of paradox. Abraham must 
have gone to the mountain, Kierkegaard believes, with every intention of killing his son 
as God asked of him. Only because he was truly committed to sacrificing Isaac was 
Abraham able to accept that by virtue of the absurd Isaac would be returned to him. For 
this reason Kierkegaard believes Abraham is something greater than the murderer which 
by rational and temporal standards he is.  
In the story Abraham begins his journey to the mountain with Isaac and on the 
way is asked by Isaac why he must commit such an act. Isaac cannot comprehend that it 
is a test of faith, so Abraham cannot explain this to Isaac. The knight of faith, however, 
exists in the infinite and irrational, yet Isaac exists in the rational and temporal; so, 
communication between Abraham and Isaac is not possible. Abraham either must remain 
silent or fall into temptation by trying to explain his act. Temptation occurs when one 
finds herself in the infinite yet attempts to justify actions in finite, temporal terms. Not 
only does one engage in action that can not be understood in finite and temporal terms 
but, as in Abraham’s case, in those terms the action is unreasonable, unacceptable or even 
evil. Temptation occurs, for Kierkegaard, when a person tries to explain actions outside 
the finite and temporal, and so outside the resources of ordinary language, language that 
always occurs in finite, temporal contexts. Language is limited to finite and temporal 
contexts.  
Wittgenstein argues in the Tractatus that one can speak only of what can be 
pictured; so the limits of rational discourse are the limits of what can be pictured. Yet 
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 Wittgenstein believed that thought and language contains a structure that shows itself. 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is an effort to exhibit that structure which can not be spoken. 
Making it manifest is an important project for Wittgenstein. Kierkegaard similarly argues 
that something exists outside language of which we cannot speak of. We can explain only 
what exists in the finite. 
Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein believe something interesting makes itself manifest 
outside this limit imposed on language and rationality, and each agrees that this cannot be 
explained within language. Further, a person in the finite cannot comprehend the infinite 
because they are limited to the constraints of the finite. This is similar to Wittgenstein’s 
logic which limits the language we use to describe our finite, temporal world. Only what 
remains inside the limits of the picture theory of propositions is describable through 
language. One cannot describe what is outside of the limits of the picture theory; one 
cannot even describe that limit. ‘Intelligible propositions picture states of affairs in the 
world’ does not itself picture a state of affairs in the world, and so it is not a genuine 
proposition. Abraham’s situation requires him to remain silent or fall into temptation 
trying to communicate the infinite. Kierkegaard claims that Abraham cannot grasp what 
is occurring within the infinite he finds himself in and would be crushed by the 
complexity of the absurd if he were to try to understand. To attempt to understand this 
paradox would be so overwhelming it would crush12 anyone who attempts to. He must 
therefore accept the movements of the infinite on faith alone. Given that Isaac has only 
the tools to understand the finite he would not be able to understand what was being 
communicated to him from his father, because his father remained in the infinite. So what 
must occur is something beyond the rational which allows for the ethical to be suspended.  
Kierkegaard presents the idea of a teleological suspension of the ethical early in 
Fear and Trembling, an idea which becomes the focus of his book. He encounters a 
problem when trying to prove the existence of the teleological suspension of the ethical. 
The problem is that language cannot explain this phenomenon. The teleological 
suspension exists within the irrational, outside of the finite temporal structure of 
language. With the teleological suspension of the ethical, Kierkegaard claims, one enters 
the religious. If a teleological suspension of the ethical doesn’t take place then Abraham 
is nothing more then a murderer. To avoid so describing Abraham requires an infinite 
faith toward God. Teleological suspension of the ethical in favor of the religious provides 
a way of allowing that actions such as Abraham’s are permissible because of the ends 
which the action strives to achieve, ends which involve infinite resignation toward God.  
I have provided the argument that what exists outside of language cannot be 
spoken. Kierkegaard believed Abraham was able to transcend the boundaries of language 
by making holding a deeply committed faith in the absurd. Trying to understand the 
absurd would have led him into temptation. Abraham remained silent. This silence can be 
seen in an entirely different way, a way in which I will show in the next section by appeal 
to Philosophical Investigations.  
12 This crushing is an emotional and mental phenomenon which occurs because of the paradox. One cannot 
believe they can understand the paradox of the knight of faith. The paradox would be so overwhelming to 
any person they would not be able to continue in the paradox. The paradox must remain a paradox, and one 
must only attempt to make the final movement by infinitely resigning all love and faith to God. But this 
final movement is so impossible only one who Kierkegaard refers to as the knight of faith will ever be able 
to make such a movement.  
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 In summary the teleological suspension of the ethical means that the ethical can 
be suspended in virtue of the end goal, which is ultimately the infinite resignation toward 
God or through faith. But one suspends the ethical only if one does not fall into 
temptation. One falls into temptation by trying to understand the suspension through 
rational temporal language. Wittgenstein claims that for one to try to say what is outside 
the limits the picture theory of propositions imposes on language is to try to say what is 
nonsense. None the less Wittgenstein is driven to try to step outside language and 
represent its structure. But he recognizes that, given the picture theory, he can utter only 
nonsense. Kierkegaard argues a similar point. He thinks that one can, and Abraham did, 
find oneself outside of language, unable to use language to justify actions which are 
ordered from outside the rational. Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, acknowledges that all of 
the claims made about language are made from outside the limits of language, outside 
constraints imposed by the picture theory of propositions, and are therefore irrational. 
Thus he proposes we see his propositions as a ladder which must be thrown away. Both 
Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard think there is something interesting and worth trying to 
say. But neither allows that there is anything that can intelligibly and rationally be said. 
Both undertake to try to say something about what is outside of the limits of language, or 
the rational, but do not allow for language to exist beyond these limits.  
A person existing within the finite only knows how to explain the infinite through 
the finite. The person in the finite, therefore, can never understand the person in the 
infinite. As for one who is in the infinite, he is as pointed out above faced with two 
alternatives. First, he can fall into temptation by trying to explain and justify his actions 
through the finite, or second, since there is no way of explaining the infinite through the 
finite, he can remain silent. Had Abraham spoke no one would have understood him; 
therefore, Kierkegaard believes Abraham remained silent. He has left the structure of 
language and cannot use the rational to explain what is outside of it. Kierkegaard explains 
Abraham cannot be mediated, meaning he cannot communicate a justification for his 
action by appeal to moral rules or universals. Those rules or universals are the stuff of our 
everyday temporal and finite understandings. Trying to communicate is trying to 
understand his action as an instance of the universal and so trying would be to fall into 
temptation. Abraham talks, but he does not try to be understood, i.e. communicate, 
because he knows he cannot be understood. To be understood would mean 
communicating the universal. The attempt to communicate by appeal to the universal 
would be to succumb to some temptation. Thus Abraham can perhaps talk but cannot 
communicate. In his act of sacrifice Abraham is therefore condemned to silence or to idle 
talk, to babble. Abraham has taken the leap of faith, which involves a simultaneous 
expression of the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the temporal. That is, he accepts the 
command to sacrifice and accepts that Isaac will be returned to him. He accepts the 
absurd. 
Wittgenstein also talks, or writes, but by his own account, he does not say 
anything. One might understand him as pointing or gesturing in the direction of what he 
would like to say if only he could. Similarly, Kierkegaard may be understood as gesturing 
or pointing in the direction of a religious expierence about which he wishes to 
communicate, if only he could. 
This similarity between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein is significant in that it 
provides a new approach to the problem Kierkegaard was dealing with involving the 
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 bounds of rationality and the suspension of the ethical. Conversely, Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy has not been traditionally thought of as being influenced by Kierkegaard but 
this similarity may offer a new approach to understanding Wittgenstein and his Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus. Both philosophers will agree there exists something beyond 
language which is able to make it-self manifest through showing, whether the picture 
theory of propositions or the teleological suspension of the ethical. But what here makes 
itself manifest cannot be described within the rational and temporal limits of language.  
This view does not exhaust the way one can interpret the story of Abraham in 
relation to language and the problem of the ineffable. An alternative view is offered by 
Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations which relies on the presence of context for 
one to be able to understand language rather then being able to explain languages 
structure. I will provide this view in the next section.  
4. Philosophical Investigations
My paper has so far illustrated a connection between Fear and Trembling and the 
Tractatus in regards to the ineffable, which exists beyond the fixed boundary of what can 
be said. Abraham has transcended the bounds of language only to find himself in a 
situation in which he can only show what cannot be said. Wittgenstein in Philosophical 
Investigations thinks one can make grammatical remarks, remarks which attempt to 
describe the structure of language. But these remarks are in a way empty. In the Tractatus 
claims about logical form were not genuine claims since they did not picture anything, so 
could not be either true or false. In Philosophical Investigations grammatical remarks are 
not remarks anyone can doubt and so are not parts of, names in, any genuine language 
game. They are instead descriptive of language games. They describe what we say, what 
we do, in particular contexts. They simply describe and don’t explain language games. It 
is nonsensical to try to speak about and thereby explain the structure of language. One 
cannot setup rational language and rationality and yet have it explain thought. Yet in 
Philosophical Investigations as in the Tractatus this attempt occurs. One can describe 
language through language, but this produces only grammatical remarks which no one 
can doubt, not genuine moves in the language game. Such remarks are like tautologies 
found in the Tractatus. I will now apply this way of understanding language, an 
understanding in terms of language games, to a view of Fear and Trembling in relation to 
the context with which the question ‘what is one’s duty toward God’ can be asked.  
I will provide a brief overview of Philosophical Investigations in regards to my 
project. However I want to note that this is in no way a complete exposition of the work, 
but rather an argument from the main theme of the book that there exists no fixed 
structure which language can say anything about. The appeal to forms of life will 
illuminate a possible way to conduct Abraham’s inability to rationally articulate the 
religious. My argument will be that the context, the form of life is what gives sense to the 
question, ‘what is one’s duty toward God’. Without that context the sense of the question 
is mysterious. Attempting to ask this question absent the context which gives it sense 
raises many problems, as I will point out as a defense of Abraham’s silence. They are 
also problems that underlie Kierkegaard’s difficulty in understanding and explaining this 
silence. First I will provide a brief explanation of Philosophical Investigations.  
 In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein argues language can only be 
understood within a social context. Only within a social context is there the possibility of 
a distinction between the correct and incorrect use of the word. A hypothetical solitary 
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speaker has only her dispositions to use a word, but her dispositions may be mistaken. It 
is agreement and disagreement with her neighbors that supplies the recipient with all for 
the normative difference between correct and incorrect use. Thus the social character of 
language precludes a private language, a language that would be understood by only the 
speaker. It is the importance of social context that I will be emphasizing. The dependence 
on social interaction renders the context of that interaction important. There is no social 
interaction except when interaction occurs in particular social context. There can be no 
private language for means of interaction. Wittgenstein says that it is in particular social 
contexts that we take part in language games. Wittgenstein says that we play language 
games because the use of language is social, cooperative, and like other games governed 
by rules. We must have language games even to provide meaning to names of objects. 
For example, an ostensive definition of ‘red’ requires shared social practices that involve 
sorting red from green, both from shapes, and both from the objects which have colors 
and shapes and colors as properties. One could imagine trying to teach a child the 
differences between ‘red’, ‘square’ and ‘chair’ by training her to sort objects first by 
color, then by shape and lastly by object. The sort of training and the kind of skills 
acquired here are akin to the training and skills acquired by the builder’s assistant in 
language game two.13 The activities in which the child and the assistant are trained to 
engage show what is meant by ‘red’ and ‘slab’. Language games provide a way of 
showing the way language is used in a form of life so serve as a basis for attributing 
sounds with a certain meaning.  
The language game one must look at in the case of Abraham is that game which is 
described by spelling out the religious form of life. Spelling out such a form of life 
involves spelling out the context in which religious language is employed. The task here 
is like that of spelling out the specific contexts, and the practices and forms of life 
engaged in, practices and forms of life in which ‘red’ and ‘slab’ are employed. The 
specific question we need to address is how one teaches, for example, ‘having a duty 
toward God’ to a child, or someone else who is not already able to engage in the 
appropriate activities, practices, or forms of life in the context of the religious. The 
context of, employment of, ‘duty toward God’ is what must be explained if the 
expression ‘duty toward God’ is to be understood. When this context, and the activities, 
practices, and forms of life therein engaged in are fully spelled out, ‘duty toward God’, 
and so duty toward God, is understood. The context and practices include the linguistic 
context. Just as understanding ‘red’ requires understanding, for example, ‘square’ and 
‘chair’, and understanding ‘slab’ requires understanding ‘beam’, so understanding ‘duty 
toward God’ requires understanding yet more religious language. That language would 
help clarify the source of this duty and what the consequence is for not obeying one’s 
duty. Such things can be clarified only by appeal to more religious language and the 
additional language can be understood only be appeal to the details of the forms of life in 
which it has been employed. Explaining the duty to God and explaining the consequence 
of not fulfilling the requirement of duty as well as explaining the source of the duty all go 
together. By way of illumination I will provide a story involving a religious person and 
how Kierkegaard would expect them lead their life so an understanding of how the 
context for language could arise for this particular situation.  
13 Philosophical Investigations paragraph 2 
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 By appeal to Wittgenstein’s views in Philosophical Investigations we can provide 
an account of the alleged unintelligibility of the religious dimension of the story of 
Abraham. The story is a case in which the context of language is missing, and so does not 
allow us from within language to provide an explanation of the religious dimension of 
Abraham’s circumstances. Abraham can provide no explanation for why he must follow 
God’s command because he has no context within which religious language such as ‘duty 
toward God’ can be understood. Thus, he cannot communicate the religious dimensions 
of his dilemma, and so no other person has an understanding of what Abraham is doing. 
The act is ineffable. Kierkegaard cannot describe why it is Abraham cannot articulate his 
action because on the view I am describing and which is derived from Philosophical 
Investigations, religious language has lost its context. One can no longer explain what 
‘duty toward God’ means and so what one’s duty toward God is because ‘the duty toward 
God’ and so duty toward God must be explained from within a form of life within a 
particular context which according to Kierkegaard no longer exists. We have slipped into 
‘Christendom’, a state in which the Christian person is not truly Christian because they 
do not have an understanding of the form of life necessary to understand religious 
language. This is apparent in Kierkegaard’s dismay with those who profess religious 
belief rather then living a life which exhibits an understanding of true Christianity. There 
is a difference in the person who lives the religious life and the person who merely 
professes living the religious life. While this explains Abraham’s inability to 
communicate the religious dimensions of his dilemma, it also seems to allow that he has a 
private understanding of that dimension. “We are what is called a ‘Christian’ nation – but 
in such a sense that not a single one of us is in the character of the New Testament.”14 
Yet it is Wittgenstein’s view in the Philosophical Investigations that Abraham 
cannot have an understanding of his action through private language and so no 
understanding is possible at all, not even by Abraham. The only possible understanding 
he could have would be the result of a relationship with God, a relationship that involved 
communication, in which both he and God understand the context of the religious 
language. Abraham still would not have the ability to articulate, to anyone other than 
God, the shared context which is needed for understanding because the understanding is 
missing, and so to everyone else Abraham seems to speak nonsensically.  
There remain a few issues which arise with this explanation. If one allows 
language to exist between Abraham and God, God either must exist within the finite, or a 
form of life between God and Abraham cannot be allowed, and so language cannot be 
understood, and so God exists as only a deeply held hyper-subjective notion which would 
require private language, and therefore according to Wittgenstein preclude understanding. 
This problem arises because it is assumed Abraham could understand the order from 
God, and that since he understood the order he committed the act in question. But this is 
problematic. It assumes a relationship with God that is either in the finite, infinite, or that 
Abraham’s understanding draws on both the finite and infinite. Coexistence within both 
the finite and infinite is problematic on textual grounds because Kierkegaard places great 
importance on an act of transcending the finite into the infinite. For a transcendence to 
occur one cannot occupy simultaneously both the finite and infinite. If that were possible 
14 Attack upon “Christendom” , Soren Kierkegaard, edited by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, 
Princeton 1983. 
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 one would not be thought to transcend the finite for the infinite but instead finite and 
infinite would be poles on a continuum. This leaves the first two possibilities. I will 
present them only briefly because much more space and time is needed to elaborate fully 
on them.  
One could be thought to allow God to share a language with Abraham because 
Abraham is commanded by God to sacrifice Isaac. Abraham must share a form of life 
with God to understand the order from God to sacrifice his son. But this is problematic 
when viewed through Kierkegaard’s reading of the story. Abraham exists in the finite 
until he commits to the act of sacrificing Isaac and enters the infinite says Kierkegaard. It 
cannot be argued that Abraham understood the order from God to sacrifice Isaac if 
Abraham existed in the finite prior to the order unless either God existed in the finite 
along with him, or something such as a hyper-subjective notion of the self existed. If God 
exists in the finite it discounts the omniscience of God which is deeply held by religious 
interpreters and also makes the form of life necessary to understand God, and by 
extension Abraham’s action, readily accessible to any other person. This would then strip 
the significance of Abraham’s action because God’s command, and so Abraham’s action, 
could be understood by people, and so people would not view him as a murderer but 
instead as obeying God. This will not work for Kierkegaard though. He does not think 
Abraham can be understood in this way, and so I propose the notion of the hyper-
subjective self. Kierkegaard, in this regards, is committed to saying it is not a religious 
act but instead a secular call to self-hood. Or a deeply subjective religious act. Both raise 
the problem of private language. If it is merely a call to selfhood then it can only be 
understood through private language. Wittgenstein denies the existence of private 
language in Philosophical Investigations.  This is a complex issue I will address in the 
next chapter of my paper. 
One could relate this problem to trying to explain duty toward God to a child. One 
would have to set up a context within duty toward God could be understood. This 
requires the naming of the objects ‘duty’ and ‘God’. Duty can be explained in relation to 
other events or actions, such as one has a duty not to lie about a promise. Duty can be 
explained by observing an action. One could show the child what duty is by keeping a 
promise and saying this is duty. Different degrees of duty exist however. Duty toward 
what is ethical is explained in such away that is tangible, like keeping a promise, but duty 
toward God is intangible. Especially for Kierkegaard, who believes religiosity should 
exist as an inward display of faith rather then an outward action which can be observed. 
Duty is difficult to explain, but duty toward God is even more so. To explain God one 
must once again have a context with which to place God. God exists either in the infinite, 
beyond what can be articulated, or as some hyper-subjective view of the self, by which 
only private language could explain. Private language as we have said is not allowed. 
Kierkegaard is trying to provide us with a picture of what duty toward God is by trying to 
explain the story of Abraham, but fails because one cannot seemingly have an 
understanding of duty in the religious sense. This seems to leave the form of life 
necessary to understand duty toward God empty. Therefore language is not capable of 
providing an explanation of the event.  
I have tried to illustrate why it is that according to Philosophical Investigations 
Abraham must remain silent about his obedience to God’s command. I have also pointed 
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 out a glaring problem which exists in trying to even say anything about God’s command 
toward Abraham.  
5. Conclusion
This paper has been an attempt to provide for the first time an explanation of 
Abraham’s silence in Fear and Trembling in regards to Wittgenstein’s language theory 
presented in the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s revised conception of language in 
Philosophical Investigations. Providing an understanding of silence via Wittgenstein 
gives a greater significance to understanding Kierkegaard’s project in Fear and 
Trembling. By looking at the problem in regards to transcending the bounds of language 
we can have a new understanding of what it is Kierkegaard views as religious language, 
namely that which exists beyond the rational. This language can not be articulated yet 
there is something important in trying to say something about it. This language can only 
be shown rather then said, it makes itself manifest. This makes the problem of Abraham’s 
silence understandable. Abraham, by virtue of faith, has transcended the bounds of 
language and must remain silent. By looking at the problem in regards to the context of 
language which attempts to explain the action we run into a deep problem of Abraham’s 
understanding of God’s order. This may not be as significant as it appears, and one can 
still understand why Abraham must remain silent. No context exists, no form of life, 
which allows for language to contain meaning. Meaning can only exist in relation to 
other language and since no language exists with which a context occurs one cannot say 
anything about the ineffable. These are two dramatically different views about silence. I 
believe the argument from Philosophical Investigations becomes more interesting when 
viewed in regards to an ethical reading of Fear and Trembling, a view I provide in 
another essay entitled ‘What cannot be said about Fear and Trembling’. The argument 
from a Tractarian reading provides a strong interpretation in regards to a religious 
reading of the text, and actually provides a strong defense for a religious reading by 
giving a new importance to religious language. This is a view I also describe in my essay 
as the meta-religious reading of Fear and Trembling because it remains religious but 
does so in a much different way then often argued for. Both are important I believe 
because I see the text as a meta-religious ethical text. My essay explains this view and 
why it overcomes the standard religious and ethical views.  
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